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Mainstream economists have long debated the role that interpersonal effects should 
play in the theory of consumption.  Alfred Marshall￿s Principles of Economics, the 19
th 
century synthesis of neoclassical economics, makes no reference to interpersonal effects, yet 
Marshall himself seemed to recognize the existence of such effects in his speeches and was 
chided by Thorstein Veblen (1898) for failing to acknowledge them in his analytical writings.  
Friedman￿s (1957) classic treatise on consumption rejects interpersonal effects as a 
determinant of consumption yet noteworthy contemporaries of Friedman, such as 
Morgenstern (1948) and Stigler (1950), and subsequent generations of economists have 
argued that such effects exist.
1 
This paper is an empirical investigation into whether interpersonal effects exist in the 
consumption of a particularly important commodity￿automobiles￿and if so, what accounts 
for the effects. Information economics and behavioral economics now represent two of the 
most popular branches of economic thought and interpersonal influences can be accounted for 
by each of these subfields.  We will analyze which of these two branches of economic thought 
best explains any interpersonal effects found in the consumption of automobiles.  This may 
help assess the relative theoretical import of these subfields in areas of economics where 
interpersonal influences play a key role. 
                                                 
1 A number of economists have taken on the challenge of developing theoretical models of interpersonal 
effects in consumption. Leibenstein (1950) developed models of snob, bandwagon, and Veblen effects in 
consumption.  Duesenberry￿s (1949/1962) relative income hypothesis argued that consumption is a function of 
where the consumer lies in the income distribution, the degree to which others (particularly his contacts) are 
consuming, and habit formation.  More recent work by Becker (1974), Pollack (1982) and Robson (1992), and in 
the asset pricing literature by Abel (1990), Gali (1994), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), and Chan and Kogan 
(2002), extend this idea.  Fads and conformity have been modeled in Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 
(1992), Bernheim (1994), and Pesendorfer (1995), among others, and Veblen effects have been the outcome of a 
wealth signaling model developed by Bagwell and Bernheim (1996). 
   2
For our purposes, it is important to define what we mean by an interpersonal effect 
that is generated by information versus behavior.  The appropriate categorization is 
distinguished by the modus operandi of the influence:  Information economics accounts for 
interpersonal effects when the consumption of others is taken as evidence about the reality of 
the consumed good, and helps to resolve uncertainty about the intrinsic utility obtained upon 
purchase.  This may include information about the quality of the good, but it may also include 
information about its resale value or the price that will be paid for the purchase.  Behavioral 
economics accounts for the effect when the influence of the consumption of others is driven 
by a psychological need to conform to (or rebel against) the social expectations of others.
2  
Motives like envy, conformity, or snobbery come to mind here. 
Information models comprise a very broad category.  Models of the rational 
expectations variety, for example, where the observed actions of consumers reveal the quality 
of a good, clearly fall within the information realm.  Such models also fit comfortably as 
extensions of the neoclassical tradition.  In static information models, the actions of all 
consumers are informative if each consumer has private information, and often, equilibrium 
prices become sufficient statistics for the private information of all consumers.  In dynamic 
information models that exhibit sequentiality, the actions of a few can generate herd behavior 
that is fully rational.  For example, in Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), private 
information is not used once a cascade is attained.  The end result is conformity, but of a type 
that is driven by the implicitly communicated information of the few early entrants to a 
decision queue, not by an emotional fad.  Price search models, as in Fishman (1992), also fall 
within this category.  Here, the benefits from the acquisition of information are weighed 
against the cost of information gathering. 
                                                 
2 This dichotomous classification is similar to a classification found in the psychology literature.  See 
Deutsch and Gerard (1955).   3
Models where consumers ￿Keep up with the Joneses￿ for emotional reasons, in the 
tradition of Duesenberry (1949/1962), fall within the behavioral category.  This is a modest 
twist on Thorstein Veblen￿s (1899/1931) sociological analysis of the origins of consumer 
preferences. Veblen￿s The Theory of the Leisure Class postulated that upper classes would try 
to distinguish themselves from the lower classes by consuming luxury goods.  The lower 
classes would try to emulate this behavior.  The motive for this emulation is behavioral in that 
it is unrelated to the intrinsic utility of the good itself. 
Economics, in the last few decades, has burst forth with theoretical models in both 
directions.  How does one know which direction is appropriate without empirical analysis of 
interpersonal effects?   Moreover, how does one even counter Friedman￿s contention that 
efforts to model interpersonal consumption effects are misguided, unless the field has 
undertaken careful empirical analyses to document that such effects exist?   
Because of the lack of data, it has been difficult to address the issue of interpersonal 
effects in the consumption function.  Akerlof (1998, p. 1007) perhaps best sums up what 
numerous authors have observed￿that statistically significant neighborhood effects are 
difficult to interpret when there are neighborhood fixed effects.    Thus, interpersonal effects 
are not validated by observing that a group of neighbors purchase similar baskets of goods or 
have similar savings rates.  Obviously, omitted variables may underlie the attributes that 
account for these similarities in consumption.  Data, even at the zip code level, cannot 
eliminate such fixed effects.  Now, however, a dataset on Finnish automobile consumption, 
consumer location, and consumer attributes allows us to implement a test of interpersonal 
effects in consumption with both extraordinary sample sizes and controls.  
In this paper, we test whether interpersonal consumption effects exist and have a 
geographic component by studying whether neighbors influence the automobile consumption   4
choice.  In doing this we are able to control for numerous common attributes that might 
account for the findings.  We also are able to analyze the source of the influence￿that is, 
whether neighbor-influenced preferences for automobiles are driven by informational or 
behavioral considerations. 
The consumption of automobiles in Finland represents an ideal testing ground for 
understanding interpersonal effects on consumption.  First, automobiles represent highly 
visible consumption, and thus offer a great opportunity to uncover a behavioral social 
influence.  Automobile consumption (along with housing) was used by Duesenberry 
(1949/1962) as an example of how behavioral interpersonal effects influence consumption.  
He wrote, 
￿What kind of reaction is produced by looking at a friend￿s new car?  The result is 
likely to be a feeling of dissatisfaction with one￿s own ￿ car.  (The dissatisfaction) ￿ 
will lead to an increase in expenditure. 
Automobile consumption is also used as an example of publicly visible consumption in 
literatures outside of economics.
3  Goods that are privately consumed, like mattresses or 
medicines, do not offer the same opportunity for addressing this aspect of interpersonal 
influence on consumption.  Second, for many of the subjects in our study, automobiles are a 
luxury rather than a necessity, and luxury goods should have more interpersonal effects than 
other goods as the scant empirical evidence on interpersonal effects recognizes.
4  In contrast 
to the U.S., most of the subjects studied have access to high quality public transportation, and 
the tax rate on a typical automobile (nearly 50%) and its fuel (about 70%) makes its 
acquisition and use very costly.  Finally, Finland collects data on a remarkably large number 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Bourne (1957), Bearden and Etzel (1982), Solomon (1999), and Peter and Olson 
(2001). 
4 For example, Basmann, Molina, and Slottje (1988) found that durables (luxury goods) had the highest 
marginal rate of substitution elasticities of any commodity group.    5
of useful control variables.  All of this makes Finnish automobile consumption ideally suited 
for our purposes. 
Using logit regressions on all consumers in the most heavily populated provinces in 
Finland, we find that neighbors who purchase a car, particularly those who purchased recently 
and are nearest in distance, increase the propensity of a consumer to purchase a car.  This 
effect exists controlling for the age, income, employment status, home ownership, marital 
status, dependents, commuting costs, and sex of the consumer, as well as observable and 
unobservable variables that are common to a larger community.  The neighborhood effect is 
also strongest within the lowest social classes, particularly if the neighbor exerting the 
influence is of the same social class or a higher social class. 
The effects are stronger and in the same direction when we analyze logit regressions 
for purchases of particular car makes and models.  That is, a near neighbor’s purchase of a 
Honda (or some other make) has an even more significant influence on the decision of a 
consumer to buy a Honda (or that other make).  The influence is stronger still if we are talking 
about Honda Accords or other specific models.  This effect is highly significant even 
controlling for the general propensity of a neighborhood to buy Hondas (or Accords).  It also 
is more pronounced for used cars and for the most recent purchases by neighbors. Such 
evidence more strongly favors the hypothesis of information dissemination among neighbors 
as the primary source of the interpersonal consumption influence. 
In addition, we find that these neighborhood effects and social class effects do not 
operate in the manner that some behavioral theorists suggest.  Some theorists, like Veblen, 
have suggested that social classes above one’s own should have the greatest influence.  That 
is, keeping up with the Joneses is more important if the Joneses are richer than you are.  Our 
findings suggest that the Joneses are most important for influencing a consumer if they are of   6
the same social class as the consumer and that same class emulation is less prevalent among 
the higher social classes and among new car buyers.  We are unaware of any behavioral 
theories that are consistent with these findings. 
Our results are organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and the empirical 
methodology.  Section 3 presents the results, beginning with summary statistics before 
introducing an extensive series of logit regressions.  Section 4 concludes the paper with a 
brief summary of our findings. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
We analyze variables derived from the union of two datasets: One is a data set on 
automobile ownership and purchases.  Another is a dataset based on the income tax returns of 
residents of two provinces of Finland.  
 
2.1. Automobile Ownership and Purchase Data 
Data on automobile purchases and ownership were obtained from the Finnish Vehicle 
Administration (FVA).  The dataset records the type of personal automobile owned by each 
car-owning resident on June 10, 2002 for all purchases made prior to 2002, the exact date the 
automobile was purchased, and registration data that allow us to infer whether the purchase 
was of a used or new vehicle.
5  (Purchases of trucks, buses, and related commercial vehicles 
are excluded.)  The data are comprehensive for residents in the provinces of Uusimaa and 
East Uusimaa.  These provinces contain Greater Helsinki and represent the most densely 
populated areas in Finland. 
                                                 
5The FVA dataset contains only the most recent purchase of a car.  Few purchases in the January 1,1999 
through December 31, 2001 sample period we focus on are missing because of the typically lengthy periods over 
which Finnish residents tend to own the same car.  In the rare instance that a person has bought more than one 
car in a single year, we consider only the most recent purchase in that calendar year.   7
The dataset is primarily used to analyze car purchase behavior between January 1, 
1999 to December 31, 2001.  Car purchases prior to January 1, 1999 are used to assess the 
degree to which purchases over the three year interval were influenced by the 5-year history 
of car purchases (or nonpurchases) of each subject￿s neighborhood.  
 
2.2. Tax Authority Data 
Our analysis develops a set of explanatory variables from Finnish tax return data, 
which we linked to the FVA dataset on a person by person basis.  These explanatory variables 
serve as controls for alternative explanations of our findings.  They also help to assess the 
mechanism through which interpersonal effects influence automobile consumption.  The 
Finnish tax return dataset records variables as of three end-of-years 1998 through 2000 
inclusive.  At the end of each of these three calendar years, we collected the following 
variables for each tax subject in the two provinces: income, year of birth, sex, marital status 
(single, married, or unmarried but cohabiting), number of dependents under 18 years old, 
work-related travel costs, whether the community lived in is city, suburban, or rural,
6 
employment status, existence of residential real estate ownership, and address. 
The data are on every resident in the two provinces, both the car owners in the June 
10, 2002 FVA dataset, as well as residents who do not own cars on that date. Except for 
address, the 1998 data are assumed to represent the data for the subjects in 1999; the 1999 
data portray these variables for 2000, etc.   
The tax data report move-in and move-out dates for each subject at a given address in 
a given year.  Therefore, addresses for each subject are current for any given day.  These 
addresses were converted to latitude and longitude coordinates on all subjects.  The 
                                                 
6 The classification by zip code is provided by Statistics Finland.   8
coordinates were then translated and rotated with parameters that were destroyed to maintain 
the anonymity of the subjects in the datasets while preserving their relative distance from one 
another.
7 
This linking of the FVA and tax datasets generates data on all residents in the 
provinces, both car purchasers, potential car purchasers, and their neighbors over the 8-year 
period, 1994-2001, with control variables over the 3-year period, 1999-2001. 
 
2.3. Data Frequency 
We analyze data at the yearly frequency.  Because the purchase history of each 
neighborhood of a subject changes from day to day, it was necessary to develop a 
methodology that alleviates concerns about the coefficient biases that intra-year seasonalities 
in car purchases might induce.  In each of the three years studied, the actual purchase dates 
are used to generate a distribution of non-purchase dates.  For example, if over the entire year 
of 1999, there are 20 times more non-purchasers than purchasers of a car, and if there were 
200 purchases on July 12, 1999, then we assume that there were 4000 non-purchases on July 
12, 1999.  Doing this for every date in 1999 generates a probability distribution function of 
non-purchases over 365 days that is identical to the probability distribution function for 
purchases.  If an individual has not purchased a car in that year, his or her (shadow) non-
purchase date within that year is randomly assigned using this distribution.  For the purpose of 
understanding how the history of purchase behavior in a neighborhood influences purchase 
decisions, we compare purchases on particular dates to the shadow non-purchase decision.  
                                                 
7 The data vendor for latitude and longitude coordinates assigns exact latitude and longitude for each 
street intersection.  The vendor, who knows the number of buildings on each side of each street, then interpolates 
the coordinates to obtain latitude and longitude for each building.  The interpolation algorithm assumes that each 
building between two adjacent intersections is of identical size.  For example, if the distance between two 
adjacent intersections is 200 meters and there are 8 buildings between the two intersections on a given side of the 
street, then each building is assumed to be 25 meters wide. All individuals living in the same building have the 
same latitude and longitude coordinates.   9
Since control variables, (except for the history of car purchases within a particular subject￿s 
neighborhood), do not vary day-to-day, this approach generates virtually the same relative 
coefficients as regressions using daily data (which would involve nearly a billion 
observations), while maintaining computational feasibility.
8   
 
2.4. Data Exclusions, Variable Construction, and Methodology 
For each calendar year analyzed, we excluded residents of the two provinces who lack 
data on address or income or anyone who resided at the same address for only a portion of the 
calendar year. We also require that all subjects (whether car purchasers or not), be at least 18 
years old before the beginning of the year being analyzed. 
Our analysis largely consists of logit regressions, with a binary action of a subject in a 
given year as the dependent variable.  This action may be buy vs. not buy a car, buy vs. not 
buy a new car, buy vs. not buy a used car, or buy vs. not buy a particular make, like a Honda, 
or a particular model, like a Honda Accord.  The right hand side variables describe the history 
of the actions of neighbors, and attributes of the subject (including attributes of his 
neighborhood and point in time) whose action is the dependent variable. 
Subjects who appear to be spouses of the subject whose action is being analyzed are 
excluded as neighbors.
9 With three years of binary decisions as the dependent variable, we 
end up with 2,520,575 binary decision observations.  Each resident appears as three 
observations except for those who moved in a given year.  In this case, they are excluded from 
the year of the move. 
                                                 
8 We have verified this by running some of our analysis with monthly data. 
9 Spouses are identified using the following criteria: same latitude and longitude coordinates, same 
move-in and move-out dates, same marital status, same number of children, opposite sex, age difference less 
than 10 years. This exclusion avoids confounding neighborhood effects with spousal effects.  For example, if one 
of the spouses buys a car, the other is less likely to buy a car, which would erroneously be interpreted as 
suggesting that a purchase by the very closest neighbor has a negative effect on the purchase behavior of the 
subject. While some automobiles are jointly owned, each automobile is listed as having only one primary owner.     10
The subjects’ control variables, which can change from year to year, are as follows. 
Age: The subject’s age in years.  It is also entered as the square of age to test for nonlinear 
effects.
10  Kids: A dummy variable that takes on the value one if the subject has at least one 
dependent that is less than 18 years old.
11  Cohabits: A dummy variable that takes on the 
value one if the subject individual has a live-in partner he or she is not married to.  Rural and 
suburban dummies: The type of community of the individual analyzed. The zero value for 
both dummies is classified as a ￿city area.￿ Homeowners: A dummy variable that is one if the 
subject has real estate or apartment wealth.  Unemployed: A dummy variable that takes on the 
value of one if the subject collected unemployment benefits for at least one day in the prior 
calendar year.  Travel cost: The subject￿s work-related travel costs (in euros) declared in the 
prior year’s tax filing.  Social class dummies: In each year, all subjects are assigned to one of 
ten equal-sized deciles based on their total income, which is the sum of income from labor 
and capital.  A person’s social class can change each year.  If all nine dummies are zero, the 
person is in the highest income decile.  Year dummies: The year of the buy vs. not-buy 
decision. The omitted dummy is 2001. 
For each subject, neighbors are rank-ordered in terms of distance.  The 500 closest 
neighbors are assigned a distance ranking from 1-500 with 500 being the most distant 
neighbor.  If several individuals live exactly at the same distance, the rankings for the 
individuals within the distance category are assigned randomly.
12 
With these variables in mind, we run pooled time-series and cross-sectional logit 
regressions with each resident assigned to a single date in a given calendar year.  If the subject 
                                                 
10 For privacy protection, all persons born prior to 1910 are assumed to have been born in 1909.  There 
are only a negligible number of automobile owners within this group, for obvious reasons. 
11 Number of children, as a substitute variable, yields virtually identical results. 
12 Population density is likely to influence neighborhood relationships if we use actual distance in lieu 
of distance ranks. Moreover, the number of people a person is likely to know and befriend is likely to be fairly 
independent of population density.  This argues for distance ranks as the more appropriate distinguishing 
characteristic of social influence.   11
is a purchaser, the date t is the actual purchase date in that year; if a non-purchaser for that 
year, the date t is the shadow purchase date in the calendar year to which the subject is 
assigned by the algorithm described earlier. 
Our model of the prototypical logit regression used in the paper can be described with 
the functional form:  
 
Binary Decision (date t, subject i) = f(date t car purchase history of subject i￿s neighborhood)  
+g(other date  t attributes of subject i) 
 
Our primary goal is to infer f() by looking at coefficients that tell us about the relevant 
arguments of f() and the derivatives of f() with respect to each of those arguments. 
 
2.5. Dimensions to the car buying decision 
In addition to studying factors that drive the decision to buy or not buy an automobile 
in a given year, we also analyze the decision of which make to buy, which model to buy, and 
whether to purchase a new car or a used car. 
Each make of car, e.g., Honda or Mercedes, is assigned its own code. Models are 
assigned dummy variables only if they can be identified as separate models and have been for 
sale as new cars between 1996 and 2001.  Models are aggregated at the main type level.  For 
example, Honda Accords and Honda Civics are treated as separate models, but no attempt has 
been made to separate the LX and EX versions of the two models. 
The model year of the car that is purchased is not reported.  Hence, we assess whether 
a car purchase is new or used with a decision algorithm that makes use of the registration 
history of an automobile.  If registration followed the U.S. standard, cars whose sale date 
corresponded to the first date of registration would be new cars, and the remainder would be   12
used cars.  However, Finnish law differs: New vehicles sold to consumers sometimes have 
already been registered by the dealer.  In this case, the first registration date is prior to the 
sale.  The FVA also records an event date, which may correspond to the first date a car 
registered in a foreign country was brought into Finland from the foreign country.  All cars 
with a sale date greater than six months past the earlier of the event date or the first 
registration date are assumed to be used cars.  It is possible that some new cars sat on dealer 
lots for more than six months and then were sold; however, such anomalous misclassifications 
are likely to be rare. 
For each of the most important make and model classes, we study separate logit 
regressions that analyze the decision to buy that particular make or model.  In some tables, we 
report the average and median coefficients across each of the make (model) regressions. 
 
3. Results 
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the data.  Panel A presents the number of 
residents who purchased or did not purchase an automobile, both new and used, in each of the 
three years of the study.  Panel B breaks the purchases down by month of the year.
13  As can 
be seen from this panel, car purchases are relatively rare events for which there is a 
pronounced seasonality.  The warmer weather months and the early fall generate more car 
buying.   
                                                 
13 The seasonalities (by month and year) in the fraction of new vs. used cars are partly due to a 
truncation effect.  A new car owned on June 10, 2002 tends to have been owned for a longer period of time than 
a used car.  Since the more distant years and early calendar months in our sample tend to be furthest from June 
10, 2002, we see the new car fraction largest in the early calendar months and distant years.  For the same 
reason, the trend towards more car purchases over time is a biased representation of what actually took place.  
Cars bought in 1999 and sold in 2001 appear only as 2001 purchases in our sample.  However, cars tend to be 
held for a fairly long period of time in Finland, so the increased frequency of purchases may partly be due to 
Finnish economic growth, which peaked in 2000.  This truncation does not affect our conclusions about social 
influence, which are robust when analyzed with monthly data or run separately for each calendar year.   13
Panel C of Table 1 presents car buying propensities based on several control variables. 
As can be seen from the Panel C, car buying propensities are smaller for those who are 
unattached to a significant other or who lack children, renters, females, and urban dwellers.  
The propensities increase in income, which is our proxy for socioeconomic status. 
 
3.1. Marginal Effects of Control Variables 
The fourth column of numbers in Table 2 presents the coefficients of our main logit 
regression.  The left hand side dummy variable takes on the value 1 if the subject purchases a 
car in a particular year.  Panel A presents results for the control variables in the regression (as 
described in the last section).  The dummy variable coefficients for all income deciles, except 
the 9th, are negative, and monotonic in the deciles. The lower the income, the lower is the 
likelihood of purchasing a car, other things equal.  Despite the statistical significance, arising 
from the large sample size of over 2.5 million observations, the marginal effect of income 
rank on car buying propensity is about the same for the 8th, 9th, and 10th income deciles.  
Older people also have a larger propensity to purchase a car, but very old people, as indicated 
by the age-squared coefficient, have less of a propensity to buy a car than middle-aged people.  
Males, subjects with children, those who are married or cohabiting with an unmarried partner, 
homeowners, and those with high travel costs also are more likely to purchase cars.  Those 
collecting unemployment benefits are more likely to purchase cars, perhaps because they have 
lost access to a company car or other transportation provided by their employer.  The urban 
and suburban dummies indicate that subjects with greater distances to travel are more likely to 
purchase cars.   
The first three columns with numbers in Panel A run the logit regressions separately 
for city, suburban, and rural communities.  The control variables have much the same impact   14
as they did in the overall logit regression except that the effect of being single (as opposed to 
married or cohabiting) no longer has a negative effect on car buying propensity in suburban 
and rural areas.  This may have something to do with the impact of public transportation in 
cities with young professionals who are single and prefer not have a car.  No similar 
transportation alternative may be available in suburban and rural areas.  
Finally, the spread of the income coefficients is larger in cities than in suburban areas 
and it is larger in suburban areas than in rural areas. This is consistent with the argument that 
a purchase of a car has the least utility attached to it in cities (where public transportation 
tends to function well) and least luxury attached to it in rural areas (where public 
transportation is less available). 
 
3.2. The Influence of Neighbors on the Automobile Purchase Decision 
Figure 1 reports on the impact of neighbor’s purchases.  In addition to the control 
variables used in Panel A, each of the four logit regressions contains 135 variables associated 
with nearness of neighbors and time at which they bought a car.  Each variable is the number 
of cars purchased by neighbors at a certain distance rank interval and within a certain time 
interval. 
Figure 1 graphs these 135 coefficients for each of the four logit regressions in Panel A.  
If each neighbor car purchase on a given day has the same influence, no matter how distant 
the neighbor or how far in the past, and influences are linearly additive, then the 135 
coefficients would be identical.  Obviously, Figure 1 suggests that they are not.  The 
coefficients for the nearest neighbors and the most recent purchases by those neighbors, 
graphed closest to the origin, are substantially larger than those elsewhere in the graph.  There   15
is a sharp peak in each of the graphs, corresponding to the nearest neighbor on the same day.
14  
Each of the surfaces in the four graphs decline as the neighbors become more distant and their 
purchases occur further back in time.  Neighbor purchases that take place more than 30 days 
ago have little influence.  In Panel A (all observations), every coefficient associated with 
purchase behavior more than 30 days in the past is below .05; most coefficients are far 
smaller.  Beyond the ten nearest neighbors, there is only modest influence.  Only two of the 
coefficients exceed .05, and most are far smaller. 
 
3.3. A Parsimonious Representation of the Neighborhood Effect 
Figure 1 suggests that there is an effect from the broader community that does not 
decay as distance increases beyond the 10th nearest neighbor or more than 30 days in the past.  
Although this ￿outer ring￿ effect is negligible by comparison, its existence is not surprising in 
that no matter how good our controls are, there are certain to be omitted variables.  For 
example, we have no data that might indicate if a particular community has excellent or poor 
public transportation.  Cross-sectional variation across communities in this unobservable 
dimension could generate a spurious neighborhood effect. Viewed another way, the function 
g() in our model  
 
Binary Decision (date t, subject i) = f(date t car purchase history of subject i￿s neighborhood) 
 +g(other date t attributes of subject i) 
 
depends on both observable and unobservable attributes.  Unobservable attributes that are 
correlated with the neighborhood￿s car purchase history could bias the coefficients used to 
infer f().  We want to understand how automobile purchase decisions by neighbors arising 
                                                 
14 As suggested earlier, we have been careful about excluding spouses.   16
from their specific idiosyncratic preferences alter purchase propensities among very near 
neighbors.  To isolate this effect, even in the presence of unobservable control variables, we 
create the variable 
 
Neighborhood effect: the number of cars purchased by the 10 nearest neighbors in the last 10 
days in excess of the expected number of purchases among the ten nearest neighbors,  
 
where the expected number of purchases among the 10 nearest numbers is computed as the 
1/4 the number of purchases among the neighbors ranked 11th through 50th in nearness over 
the prior ten days.  The latter can be viewed as a base neighborhood purchase rate.   
Subtracting it controls for omitted common factors that influence neighborhood purchases.  
This subtraction effectively orthogonalizes the argument of the function f() to any omitted 
variable in the function g() that drives purchases in the larger neighborhood.
15 
16 
Panel B of Table 2 describes the logit regression results using this more parsimonious 
one-variable representation of the neighborhood effect in lieu of the more complex 135 
neighborhood variables.  The control variables have approximately the same coefficients as 
those in Panel A.  The coefficient on neighborhood effect, .112, is highly significant with a t-
statistic of 9.71.  In other words, the logged odds ratio increases by .112 if your 10 nearest 
neighbors recently purchased one additional car relative to your more distant neighbors in the 
                                                 
15  The neighborhood effect measured by this variable is a conservative estimate of the true 
neighborhood effect. This is because not all of the neighborhood effect is confined to the ten closest neighbors. 
In addition to controlling for unobservable factors, this variable also deducts some genuine neighborhood effect 
by subtracting the influence of the ￿outer ring￿ neighbors.
 
 
16 Our results are qualitatively similar when we use thirty days as the window for past purchases by 
neighbors in lieu of ten days, although a bit weaker.  This is partly attributable to noise in the influence variable.  
When we lengthen the window, the comparison group, (the outer ring), is more likely to generate purchases. 
Given the fact that these outer ring consumers are considerably less influenced by the neighborhood effect, 
cumulating their purchases over a longer horizon generates more noise in the variable.   17
same time frame.  Because the odds ratio is close to zero (as the probability of buying a car is 
small), a logit coefficient of .112 means that the probability of a car purchase is scaled up by a 
factor of about 12 per cent (multiplied by about 1.12) for each additional near neighbor 
purchase in the last ten days.  Given that the daily probability of buying a car is close to zero, 
one still achieves a negligible probability of a car purchase on a given day no matter how 
many neighbors have purchased cars in the last ten days.  However, as a percentage of that 
low probability of a car purchase on a given day, the increase is quite substantial.
17 
 
3.4. How Population Density and Social Class Modify the Influence of Neighbors 
Panel B of Table 2 indicates that neighborhood influence varies inversely with 
population density: Rural areas exhibit the greatest neighborhood influence while cities 
exhibit the least.  Figure 1 elaborates on this in showing that the neighborhood influence 
differences across the first 3 columns of Table 2 Panel B are largely driven by the influence of 
the nearest neighbor purchasing a car 0-4 days prior to the date of the car buying decision.  On 
day 0, for example, the coefficient on the same day, the nearest neighbor dummy coefficient 
is more than twice as large for rural areas as it is for cities.  This pattern is inconsistent with a 
prediction of Veblen (1899/1931, pp. 88-89).  He pointed out that residents of rural areas are 
more familiar with each other and thus would be less apt to emulate conspicuous 
consumption.
18  There is no point to signaling status via consumption when your neighbors 
already know that status. However, despite the additional distance, the stronger ties to 
                                                 
17  The summary statistics here are also impressive.  Of the 211,173 purchases, there were 7,662 
purchases by the 10 nearest neighbors in the prior ten days, which is 1,983 more purchases than would be 
expected by chance. 
18 He also mentioned that rural areas are less prone to conspicuous consumption because they maintain 
a lower standard of decency. 
   18
neighbors in less densely populated areas generate more social influence on consumption, not 
less.
19 
Figure 2 plots the neighbor influence coefficient for the regression in Panel B run 
separately for each income decile.  Those in the lowest social classes are most influenced by 
neighbor purchases.  This is a rather surprising finding if emotion or envy is the source of 
emulation.  First, there is no a priori reason to think that those in the lowest income are the 
most susceptible to emotional urges in their consumption of luxury goods.  Indeed, behavioral 
theories of consumption (e.g., Duesenberry (1949/1962, last paragraph) suggest that social 
considerations are most important in the upper income groups.  Moreover, the loss to intrinsic 
well being from a consumption ￿mistake￿ due to envy is far greater for someone with less 
income.  Under fully rational consumption, the basket of goods of a lower income consumer 
has a larger proportion of necessities.   For this consumer, indulgence in luxury goods due to 
envy or urge to conform is more likely to crowd out necessities like shelter or food.  If a 
consumption ￿mistake,￿ like a Mercedes-Benz purchase arising only from envy of a neighbor 
is a greater sacrifice for those in the lowest income classes, it is less likely to happen.  The 
data do not support this prediction. 
An explanation that accounts for the presence of consumption emulation within the 
lowest income groups is information sharing.  Uncertainty about quality and final pricing is a 
larger problem with used and/or inexpensive automobiles.  Thus, consumers in the lower 
income classes would tend to observe the actions of others and communicate with others to 
resolve this uncertainty.  We will test this hypothesis shortly by analyzing the used vs. new 
car social influence coefficient. 
                                                 
19 There is another explanation that accounts for some but not all of this result.  In urban settings, many 
buildings contain more than ten residents.  In these cases, we cannot pinpoint the ten nearest neighbors.  (In 
cases where we can, the urban and rural influence coefficients are far closer, but the rural coefficient is still 
larger.)   19
Figure 3, which plots the same coefficient for regressions run separately by the 
differences in income deciles, indicates that the emulation of neighbors in higher income 
deciles does not entirely drive the purchases.  Neighbors in one’s own income decile have 
about the same influence coefficient as neighbors in higher income deciles.  On the other 
hand, the influence of neighbors in the three higher income deciles is about twice as large as 
the influence in the three lower deciles.  While this is consistent with Veblen’s conspicuous 
consumption hypothesis and Duesenberry￿s relative income hypothesis, neither would have 
predicted that there would be any influence from those in a lower income decile.
20 
Table 3 quantifies these phenomena in more detail.  The first column of coefficients, 
used for comparison purposes, is the regression from Table 2 Panel B.  The second and third 
columns focus on the influence of neighbors who fall into the higher, same, or lower income 
deciles.  The second and third columns show that the car purchase behavior of neighbors in 
the same income decile has the greatest influence, while the least influence is among 
neighbors in lower income deciles. (The fourth column, Model 4, was reported on in Figure 
2.) 
On balance, we attribute the pattern of influence among neighbors as a phenomenon 
that is related to information dissemination.  An additional piece of evidence for this is that 
purchases by very near neighbors on the same day or in the very recent past drive the 
neighbor influence phenomenon.  It is plausible that neighbors exchange information about 
the attributes of automobiles or dealer pricing and this information sharing induces similar 
purchases among neighbors.  For the same day purchases, it is likely that neighbors who have 
                                                 
20 Veblen (1931, Chapter 5) writes, ￿￿ each class envies and emulates the class next above it in the 
social scale, while it rarely compares itself with those below or with those who are considerably in advance.  
Duesenberry (1962, p. 101) states ￿Low-income groups are affected by the consumption of high-income groups 
but not vice versa. ￿ The lowest-income group will be affected by the consumption of the next higher group but 
not vice versa, the lowest but one will be affected by the next higher but not vice versa, and so on.￿  On the other 
hand, income is a noisy proxy for social status.  Variables affecting social status that we do not control for, like 
education, could account for some of the modest influence of lower income deciles.   20
shared information are shopping together.  It is unlikely that a purchase is taking place in the 
afternoon to keep up with a neighbor’s purchase in the morning.  Envy is a more persistent 
emotion.  The Mercedes in your neighbor￿s driveway does not go away after a few days, a 
few months, or even a few years.  If envy of it were driving you to consume, there is no 
reason to believe that influence would decline so rapidly as time elapsed since the neighbor￿s 
purchase.  
If the information story is behind the neighbor influence coefficient pattern, the value 
of the neighbor￿s information from the purchase (or pre-purchase research) should decline 
with time.  For one, new models of the neighbor￿s car and substitutes for it are being 
introduced all the time.  Public information about these automobiles, via consumer and 
government testing units also may dilute the value of the neighbor￿s information over time.  
The neighbor￿s information also may have been disseminated prior to purchase, perhaps 
months earlier.  If it is a new car, the vehicle order may have been placed long before the 
recorded purchase date. 
This information could be about the quality of the car, but given the rapidity of the 
decline in the social influence coefficient over time, it is just as likely, if not more likely, to be 
information about pricing.  For example, a consumer may travel to the dealer, find that the 
dealer is more flexible about pricing or financing than expected.  He might also discover that 
the dealer has a large inventory to dispose of or an inventory containing exactly the same 
hard-to-get color that the neighbor is looking for.  Communicating this relatively private 
information to close friends leads to an abnormal number of purchases within a concentrated 
social circle. 
It is also possible that the purchase of a car triggers a sale of the purchaser￿s 
previously owned car to a neighbor or vice versa.  However, the ages of cars purchased by   21
nearby neighbors (ranked 1-10) in the last 30 days, are significantly closer to one another (t-
value = 3.04) than the ages of cars purchased by more distant neighbors (ranked 11-50).
21  
This is the opposite of what an abundance of neighbor-to-neighbor sales would predict. 
Moreover, if intra-neighborhood sales were the explanation for the social influence 
coefficient, one would predict that close neighbors would not exhibit any additional 
concentration of purchases of individual makes and models.  We investigate this issue next. 
 
3.5. Purchases of Used vs. New Cars and of Particular Makes and Models 
If information drives the influence coefficient, we would not expect the influence to be 
about automobiles in general.  Learning that financing rates for all automobiles are low might 
be important, but it is less likely to be a critical piece of information among closest neighbors 
than information about a specific make or model￿s qualities or pricing.  Learning that a 
particular make of car accelerates very nicely, that the seats are comfortable, or that research 
done by the neighbor suggests it gets great fuel mileage or doesn￿t tend to require frequent 
repairs, is more likely to be useful to a prospective consumer.  Similarly, it is more useful to 
learn that a particular dealer who specializes in Volvo wagons is likely to give favorable 
financing terms because of his current inventory situation.  Such information may not be as 
readily available from public sources.  Even if it is information of a type that is advertised in 
the classified section of a newspaper, friends may further publicize the information by calling 
attention to it with a purchase or by announcing it in conversation.   
Thus, the information story predicts that we would also expect similar makes and 
models to be purchased by neighbors.  We might also expect neighbor influence to be more of 
a used car purchase phenomenon, where quality concerns or pricing ambiguity may be more 
                                                 
21 The same finding applies if we restrict our focus to purchases in the last ten days.   22
important.  Behavioral models of social influence on consumption would almost certainly 
argue that new car purchases by neighbors would have a greater influence on purchase 
behavior. 
The first coefficient column in Table 4 indicates that a neighbor’s used car purchase 
affects the probability of a purchase more than a new car purchase.  The used car coefficient 
is about 50% larger than the new car coefficient.  As discussed above, this is not consistent 
with behavioral theories of social influence on consumption, but it may be indicative of 
information sharing among neighbors. 
To investigate this further, Table 4 analyzes new car purchases and used car purchases 
separately.  In the second column, the dependent (dummy) variable is one only if the subject 
makes a new car purchase.  In the third column, it is one only if the subject makes a used car 
purchase.  Clearly, used car purchases by neighbors influence used car purchases to a greater 
extent than new car purchases by neighbors influence used car purchases.  Similarly, new car 
purchases by neighbors influence new car purchases more than new car purchases influence 
used car purchases.  The larger new car to new car and used car to used car coefficients are 
consistent with information being disseminated about like automobiles.  On the other hand, it 
may also be consistent with keeping up with (but not one-upping) the Joneses. 
The table documents that used car purchases are partly influenced by neighbors’ 
purchases of new cars.  One can debate whether behavioral theories predict this.  On the one 
hand, is it possible to ￿keep up with the Joneses￿ when they buy a new car by buying a used 
car?  On the other hand, one might argue that lower income consumers lack the means to 
perfectly emulate the upper classes, but that doesn￿t mean their attempts at imitation reflect a 
weaker emotional urge.  People do buy fake Rolex watches for a reason.  In the end, however, 
the behavioral theories force us to accept too many anomalies, even within this table, to be   23
credible.  For example, if the Joneses buy a used car, behavioral theories, like Veblen￿s 
conspicuous consumption, should also predict that we might observe some consumers ￿one- 
upping￿ the Joneses by buying a new car.  Yet that does not happen.   
Consistent with the information hypothesis, the influence of neighbors’ used car 
purchases on used car purchases is clearly greater than the influence of neighbors’ new car 
purchases on new car purchases.  Advertising, reviews, and warrantees all serve to mitigate 
the asymmetric information problem in new car purchases, or serve as an additional set of 
factors that influence purchases.  They operate to a lesser degree in the used car market if at 
all. 
To help further resolve the issue of whether information or behavioral considerations 
drive these results, Table 5 Panel A analyzes the logit regression of Tables 2 and 3 separately 
for each of the 15 most popular makes of automobiles.  Panel A focuses on two influence 
variables rather than one.  ￿Same make￿ is the number of purchases of the make listed in the 
row among the 10 nearest neighbors within the last 10 days (adjusted for the expected number 
of purchases of that make, in a manner analogous to the adjustment employed for the 
influence variable used previously in the paper).   The ￿other makes" variable is the number 
of purchases of a make other than that listed in the row among 10 nearest neighbors within the 
last 10 days (adjusted for the expected number of purchases of the other makes).  Clearly, a 
purchase by a neighbor tends to generate a purchase of the same make.  The average 
coefficient for ￿same make￿ is more than five times the size of the influence coefficient for 
￿other makes.￿  For about half the makes, there is no significant influence on the purchase 
probability arising from a neighbor’s purchase of a different make. 
The difference is even stronger for the average coefficient of the same model when we 
look at the 10 most popular models.  The variables for same make and model and same make   24
different model are computed analogously to the influence variables studied in Panel A.  As 
Table 5 Panel B reports, the median ￿same make and model￿ influence coefficients are almost 
twice as large as the ￿same make different model￿ influence coefficients and almost 10 times 
larger than the ￿other make￿ influence coefficient.  Indeed, as Panel B indicates, only 3 of the 
10 most popular models are significantly influenced by neighbors’ purchases of different 
makes. 
Shared information about particular makes and models appears to be driving the 
shared desire among neighbors to purchase a car.  On the other hand, almost all of the 
coefficients on the different make or model neighbor influence variable are positive.  It is 
therefore possible that at least a small portion of a neighbor’s influence is not due to 
information but to envy. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This study has documented a highly significant social influence in Finnish automobile 
consumption.  One￿s nearest neighbors￿ purchases appear to influence purchases, particularly 
of the same make and model, and of used cars, and to a far larger extent within a short time 
frame.  It is difficult to argue that emotional biases lie behind the social influence observed 
when the social influence on consumption is intensified to such a degree by these factors.  
That does not have to mean that behavioral effects, rooted in psychological biases, will never 
be found in consumption.  However, we looked hard and have superb data to help identify 
behavioral effects that might drive the social influence.  Frankly, the evidence supporting 
emotion as a key driver of the social influence on consumption is not there. 
Since common folk wisdom suggests that consumption of this commodity is 
particularly prone to interpersonal behavioral influences like envy or snobbery, the absence of   25
behaviorally generated social influences in this consumption arena calls into question the 
efficacy of such models in other economic applications where the data are not of the same 
quality. 
Information transmission of some sort is better at explaining why consumers are 
observed to keep up with the Joneses.  We consider this a rather promising finding.   
Information asymmetries and whether and how they are resolved have always been critical to 
economics.  However, it is only in the last 30 years that the field has witnessed an explosion 
in the theoretical study of these important topics.  There are now a variety tools and insights 
that allow researchers to more accurately model the role that information plays in the 
consumption function.  Particularly with capital goods, like automobiles, where consumption 
decisions that are costly to reverse become long-term, information is essential.  While the 
formation of preferences and its link to information and learning has not been on the short list 
of hot topics in economics, we contend that it offers a rich array of theoretical opportunities as 
well as an exciting challenge for empirical researchers.  The fact that the neighbors exerting 
influence are particularly close suggest that there may be geographic barriers to learning that 
are worth investigating. 
There is very little evidence that neighborhood effects are tied to anything but 
geographic information barriers.  One should not interpret this finding as suggesting that 
behavioral economics has no role to play in understanding issues like equilibrium, just that 
behavioral factors may be of far smaller import than information barriers.    26
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of automobile purchases and non-purchases 
 
For each of the three years 1999 to 2001, Panel A reports the total number of car purchases 
and non-purchases in two Finnish provinces. Automobile purchases are classified into two 
main categories, new cars and used cars. A car is assumed new if its sale occurs no more than 
six months after the first registration day. Individuals who did not purchase a car in a given 
year are recorded as non-purchasers. Panel B reports the monthly distribution of purchases 
and non-purchases. In a given year, the number of non-purchases for a particular month has 
been computed by assuming that the distribution of non-purchase dates is the same as the 
distribution of purchase dates. The fraction of new automobile purchases indicates the 
proportion of new car purchases to all purchases.  Panel C reports the propensity to purchase 
in each of the three years based on classifications using the following control variables: 
gender, age, marital status (single, cohabits or married), dependents under 18 years (yes/no), 
total income rank deciles (based on labor plus capital income), homeownership status, 
employment status, and the type of community in which the subject is living (urban, 
suburban, or rural).  
 
Panel A. Number of purchases and non-purchases by year
1999 2000 2001 Totals
New car purchases 19,922 24,066 19,993 63,981
Used car purchases 34,100 49,367 63,725 147,192
Purchases, totals 54,022 73,433 83,718 211,173
Non-purchases 774,467 773,942 760,993 2,309,402
Purchases and non-purchases, totals 828,489 847,375 844,711 2,520,575
Panel B. Number of purchases and non-purchases by month
Month Purchases Non-purchases Totals Fraction of new
1 15,280 168,861 184,141 0.394
2 13,696 150,493 164,189 0.333
3 17,363 191,357 208,720 0.329
4 17,816 197,846 215,662 0.334
5 20,402 223,330 243,732 0.337
6 18,999 208,854 227,853 0.316
7 18,984 208,076 227,060 0.280
8 19,752 213,846 233,598 0.281
9 19,052 208,150 227,202 0.279
10 19,541 210,715 230,256 0.270
11 17,098 184,738 201,836 0.257
12 13,190 143,136 156,326 0.227
Totals 211,173 2,309,402 2,520,575 0.303    29
Panel C. Propensity to purchase by year
        Propensity to purchase by year
1999 2000 2001 Totals
Females 0.038 0.051 0.056 0.048
Males 0.096 0.128 0.148 0.124
18-24 0.036 0.059 0.085 0.060
25-29 0.064 0.095 0.128 0.096
30-34 0.078 0.109 0.136 0.107
35-39 0.084 0.111 0.132 0.109
40-44 0.084 0.109 0.128 0.107
45-49 0.082 0.106 0.119 0.102
50-54 0.080 0.104 0.111 0.098
55-59 0.075 0.095 0.100 0.091
60-64 0.062 0.077 0.078 0.073
65-69 0.049 0.058 0.058 0.055
70- 0.021 0.025 0.025 0.024
Single 0.048 0.068 0.083 0.067
Cohabits 0.086 0.120 0.147 0.118
Married 0.081 0.104 0.113 0.099
No kids 0.055 0.074 0.086 0.072
Kids 0.090 0.119 0.136 0.115
Lowest income 0.026 0.036 0.046 0.036
2 0.029 0.046 0.061 0.046
3 0.028 0.043 0.056 0.042
4 0.033 0.046 0.058 0.046
5 0.050 0.066 0.080 0.066
6 0.060 0.081 0.098 0.080
7 0.071 0.098 0.114 0.095
8 0.091 0.119 0.135 0.115
9 0.109 0.139 0.149 0.132
Highest income 0.120 0.149 0.151 0.140
Non-homeowner 0.045 0.066 0.087 0.066
Homeowner 0.081 0.103 0.108 0.098
Employed 0.065 0.089 0.100 0.084
Unemployed 0.065 0.070 0.094 0.081
Urban 0.055 0.073 0.083 0.070
Suburban 0.081 0.106 0.119 0.102
Rural 0.090 0.122 0.144 0.119
Whole sample 0.065 0.087 0.099 0.084  30
Table 2 
Baseline logit regressions of neighbor influence by type of community 
 
Table 2 reports coefficients and test statistics for subsets of variables for eight logit 
regressions. The dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy variable indicating whether 
an individual purchased a car in a given year.  Panel A reports the coefficients of control 
variables and their t-values for three types of communities: cities, suburban, and rural areas, 
as well as for the overall regression. The control variables include male dummy, the subject￿s 
age in years, the square of age, a dummy variable that is 1 if the subject has at least one 
dependent, marital status dummy (1 = married), a cohabit dummy (1 = have a live in partner), 
rural and suburban dummies depending on the type of community in which the subject lived, 
homeownership dummy (if the subject had real estate or apartment wealth the previous year), 
unemployment dummy (if the subject collected unemployment benefits during the prior year), 
travel costs (the subject￿s work-related travel costs in euros during the prior year), social class 
decile rank dummies, based on the sum of labor and capital income, and year dummies for 
years 1999 and 2000.  The 135 time-distance variables included in the regression are reported 
in Figure 1.  Each time-distance variable is computed as the number of cars purchased by the 
neighbors at that distance rank and time interval.  Panel B reports results from parsimonious 
neighborhood effect regressions analogous to those in Panel A.  Instead of the battery of 135 
time-distance variables in Panel A, the neighbor effect is the number of automobiles 
purchased by the 10 nearest neighbors in the last 10 days less one quarter the number of 
purchases by the neighbors ranked 11
th through 50
th in nearness in the last ten days. This 
parsimonious regression specification includes the same control variables as Panel A, but the 
coefficients on the control variables are omitted for brevity.  
   31
Panel A. Control variables for 135 time-distance variable regressions
         Coefficients          t-values
Independent variables City Suburban Rural All City Suburban Rural All
(Constant) -3.560 -3.342 -2.857 -3.468 -98.33 -54.13 -38.94 -124.90
Male 0.977 0.836 0.668 0.884 139.40 82.26 55.72 170.63
Age 0.028 0.033 0.030 0.029 20.27 14.88 11.45 26.94
Age squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -34.59 -22.65 -19.49 -45.14
Kids 0.026 0.017 0.042 0.022 2.94 1.37 2.86 3.41
Married 0.146 -0.015 -0.057 0.084 17.63 -1.14 -3.74 13.30
Cohabits 0.162 0.018 -0.038 0.109 9.40 0.75 -1.37 8.75
Rural 0.203 25.09
Suburban 0.096 15.00
Homeowner 0.176 0.180 0.147 0.168 22.72 14.70 10.39 28.36
Unemployed 0.128 0.089 0.118 0.119 9.27 4.15 4.87 11.40
Travel cost 2.0E-06 1.5E-05 1.2E-05 8.3E-06 2.46 18.76 15.36 18.21
Individual’s social class
Lowest -1.347 -1.147 -0.990 -1.227 -57.64 -33.91 -24.69 -71.30
2 -1.019 -0.763 -0.642 -0.887 -57.37 -28.56 -20.24 -66.69
3 -0.824 -0.565 -0.471 -0.703 -48.58 -22.05 -15.86 -55.57
4 -0.700 -0.412 -0.295 -0.564 -43.89 -17.47 -10.51 -47.52
5 -0.428 -0.206 -0.141 -0.327 -30.80 -10.18 -5.59 -31.52
6 -0.285 -0.106 -0.077 -0.205 -22.22 -5.71 -3.27 -21.47
7 -0.183 -0.056 0.006 -0.121 -15.27 -3.25 0.27 -13.52
8 -0.054 0.030 0.081 -0.014 -4.81 1.89 3.78 -1.65
9 0.017 0.068 0.105 0.040 1.61 4.53 4.97 4.95
Year 1999 -0.144 -0.157 -0.208 -0.138 -12.78 -7.27 -7.65 -14.84
Year 2000 -0.020 -0.025 -0.039 -0.015 -2.21 -1.64 -2.04 -2.13
Cox & Snell R Square 0.042 0.042 0.048 0.046
Nagelkerke R Square 0.104 0.087 0.092 0.104
N 1,636,620 552,648 331,307 2,520,575  
 
 
Panel B: Parsimonious regressions
City Suburban Rural All
Neighborhood effect 0.058 0.135 0.176 0.112
t-value 3.31 6.53 7.67 9.71
Cox & Snell R Square 0.04 0.041 0.046 0.044
Nagelkerke R Square 0.099 0.084 0.088 0.101
N 1,636,620 552,648 331,307 2,520,575  32
Table 3 
Effects of social class as moderators of neighbor influence 
 
Table 3 reports coefficients and t-statistics (below the coefficient) for four logit regressions. 
The dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy variable indicating whether an 
individual purchased a car in a given year or not. In Model 1, the neighbor effect is the 
number of automobiles purchased by the 10 nearest neighbors in the last 10 days less one-
quarter the number of purchases among the neighbors ranked 11
th through 50
th in nearness in 
the last ten days. In Models 2 thru 4, neighbor purchases are computed in an analogous 
manner, but are divided into two or more subcategories depending on the social class of the 
neighbors in relation to that of the subject. The social class of a subject and her neighbor are 
based on their total income (labor plus capital income). Social class 1 refers to the lowest total 
income decile of all individuals in the sample and social class 10 to the highest total income 
decile. The control variables are the same as in Table 2, but their coefficients are omitted for 
brevity. 
 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Neighborhood effect conditional on
All observations 0.112
9.71
Neighbor’s social class lower than individual’s social class 0.083 0.083
4.55 4.55
Neighbor’s social class the same as individual’s social class 0.146
5.07
Neighbor’s social class greater than individual’s social class 0.115
6.54
Neighbor’s social class greater than or equal to individual’s social class 0.123
8.22



















Used vs. New Cars: Neighbor Influence Regressions 
 
Table 4 reports coefficients and t-statistics (below the coefficient) for three logit regressions. 
In the first column, the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether an 
individual purchased any car in a given year.  In the second column, the dependent variable is 
a dummy variable indicating whether an individual purchased a new car in a given year. A car 
is assumed new if its sale occurs no more than six months after the first registration day. In 
the third column, the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual 
purchased a used car in a given year. The new (used) car neighbor effect is the number of new 
(used) automobiles purchased by the 10 nearest neighbors in the last 10 days less one quarter 
the number of new (used) car purchases among the neighbors ranked 11
th through 50
th in 
nearness in the last ten days. The control variables are the same as in Table 2, but their 
coefficients are omitted for brevity. 
 
Buy any car Buy new car Buy used car
Neighborhood effect conditional on vs. not vs. not vs. not
Neighbor bought new car 0.082 0.084 0.072
3.80 2.33 2.83
Neighbor bought used car 0.124 0.012 0.159
9.10 0.48 10.20  34
Table 5 
Effects of the similarity of make and model on neighbor influence 
 
Panel A reports coefficients and t-statistics for fifteen logit regressions. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual purchased a car representing 
the given make in a given year. The same make (other makes) neighbor variable is the number 
of automobiles representing the same (a different) make purchased by the 10 nearest 
neighbors in the last 10 days less one quarter the number of same (different) make purchases 
among the neighbors ranked 11
th through 50
th in nearness in the last ten days. Panel B shows 
the results for 10 logit regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating 
whether an individual purchased a car representing the given model in a given year. The same 
model (same make, other models) neighbor effect variable is the number of automobiles 
representing the same model (different models, same make) purchased by the 10 nearest 
neighbors in the last 10 days less one quarter the number of same model (different models, 
same make) purchases among the neighbors ranked 11
th through 50
th in nearness in the last 
ten days. The other makes neighborhood effect is computed as in Panel A.  The control 
variables in both panels are the same as in Table 2, but their coefficients are omitted for 
brevity. 
 
Panel A: Effects of the similarity of make only on neighbor influence 
Coefficients t-values
Make Same make Other makes Same make Other makes
Opel 0.379 0.145 7.07 4.70
Toyota 0.516 0.131 10.31 4.28
Ford 0.410 0.106 6.30 2.99
Nissan 0.479 0.068 7.54 1.89
Volkswagen 0.232 0.012 3.02 0.29
Volvo 0.374 0.101 4.26 2.43
Peugeot 0.308 0.077 3.11 1.72
Renault 0.570 0.094 5.70 2.00
Mazda 0.456 0.081 3.75 1.56
Fiat 0.391 0.090 2.92 1.68
Citroen 0.473 0.031 3.03 0.50
Mercedes Benz 0.532 -0.013 3.54 -0.21
Honda 0.807 0.097 4.80 1.48
Saab 1.078 0.217 6.94 3.47
Mitsubishi -0.289 0.014 -0.84 0.18
Average 0.448 0.083
Median 0.456 0.090  35
Panel B 
The effects of the similarity of make and model on neighbor influence 
Coefficients t-values
Same make, Same make,
Make and model Same model different model Other makes Same model different model Other makes
Toyota Corolla 0.677 0.429 0.159 7.95 4.51 3.77
Opel Astra 0.330 0.088 0.042 2.54 0.77 0.79
Volkswagen Golf 0.350 0.149 -0.009 2.14 0.98 -0.15
Opel Vectra 0.818 0.406 0.223 4.81 3.29 3.60
Nissan Primera 0.858 0.216 -0.023 5.33 1.49 -0.33
Ford Escort 0.703 0.505 0.221 3.24 3.47 3.24
Nissan Almera 0.681 0.513 0.075 3.34 3.69 1.05
Mazda 323 0.743 0.620 0.112 3.44 2.82 1.52
Toyota Avensis 0.716 0.432 0.070 3.25 3.22 0.93
Mazda 626 0.328 0.074 0.048 1.19 0.27 0.61
Average 0.620 0.343 0.092
Median 0.692 0.418 0.072  36
Figure 1 
The joint effect of time and distance rank on neighbor influence 
 
Figure 1 plots 135 time-distance variable coefficients for the logit regressions of neighbor 
influence described in Table 2. The dependent variable in all regressions is a dummy variable 
indicating whether an individual purchased a car in a given year. Each time-distance variable 
is computed as the number of cars purchased by the neighbors at that distance rank and time 
interval. There are nine distance rank intervals and fifteen time intervals. Distance intervals 
denoted by numbers 1 thru 5 represent the number of purchases of each of the five nearest 
neighbors (usually zero or one), whereas intervals 6-10, 11-50, 51-200, and 201-500 represent  
the collective number of purchases of 5-300 neighbors, depending on the interval. Time 
intervals t1-t2 refer to the number of purchases by a particular group of neighbors between t1 
calendar days ago and t2 calendar days ago.  A single number means that t1 equals t2. Panel A 
plots the coefficients for the whole sample, Panel B for individuals living in urban 
communities, Panel C for individuals living in suburban communities, and Panel D for 
individuals living in rural communities. The coefficients for the control variables are reported 
in Panel A of Table 2.   
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Figure 2 
The effect of social class on neighbor influence 
 
Figure 2 plots the neighbor effect coefficients and their 95% upper and lower bounds for each 
social class. The results are obtained from ten logit regressions where each regression is 
restricted to only those individuals belonging to the social class. The dependent variable in all 
regressions is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual purchased a car in a given 
year. The neighbor effect is the number of automobiles purchased by the 10 nearest neighbors 
in the last 10 days less one quarter the number of purchases among the neighbors ranked 11
th 
through 50
th in nearness in the last ten days. A subject￿s social class decile is based on the 
sum of labor and capital income. The control variables are the same as in Table 2, but their 
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Figure 3 
The effect of social class difference on neighbor influence 
 
Figure 3 plots the neighbor effect coefficients from Model 4 in Table 3 along with their 95% 
upper and lower bounds. The results are obtained from a logit regression where the dependent 
variable in all regressions is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual purchased a 
car in a given year. The neighbor effect is the number of automobiles purchased by the 10 
nearest neighbors in the last 10 days less one quarter the number of purchases among the 
neighbors ranked 11
th through 50
th in nearness in the last ten days. A subject￿s social class 
decile is based on the sum of labor and capital income. The control variables are the same as 
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